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Abstract 
There is a discrepancy in the literature regarding the effect of repeated experience on 
children’s suggestibility. Some researchers have concluded that repeated experience increases 
children’s suggestibility for variable details whereas others have reported no detrimental effect. 
This study demonstrated that the type of question used to test memory (cued-recall vs. yes/no 
questions) could account for the different reported conclusions. Children aged 5-6 years took part 
in an event either once or four times. Three or 21 days later, they were given a suggestive interview 
about the single/final occurrence of the event during which half of the event details were 
inaccurately described. When later asked yes/no questions, the children with repeated experience 
agreed with more of the suggestions than did those in the single-experience condition, especially at 
the longer delay. In relation to cued-recall questions, however, experience did not mediate the 
number of times that false suggestions from the biasing interview were reported. This latter finding 
was revealed irrespective of the retention interval.  
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The effect of repeated experience on children’s suggestibility across two question types. 
 
 Most research on children’s suggestibility follows a model where the child participants 
experience a single staged event, are later exposed to information about the event by an 
interviewer (some of which is inaccurate) and are then interviewed about the event. In many trials 
in which children testify, however, the matter involves an event that was repeated (e.g., acts of 
sexual or physical abuse that occurred on numerous occasions). In normal legal proceedings, for 
an alleged offender to be charged and convicted in relation to a repeated offence, at least one 
specific occurrence must be identified with reasonable precision with reference to place and time 
(see S v. R. 1989). The act of remembering an occurrence of a repeated event after a delay in time 
is a more difficult task compared to remembering a single event because witnesses need to make 
source judgements about when particular details occurred in the sequence. These judgements are 
especially difficult for child witnesses whose knowledge of time and sequencing ability is not as 
well developed as that of adults (Friedman, 1991). It is critical, therefore, that lawyers and 
investigative interviewers consider research that examines ways of minimising error in child 
witnesses’ accounts about repeated events. In the present study, we assessed the effect of repeated 
experience on children’s suggestibility across two types of questions that are commonly used in 
forensic settings; cued-recall versus closed (yes/no) questions (Home Office and Department of 
Health, 1992; Lamb et al., 1996; Warren et al., 1996).  
Previous research has demonstrated that the degree to which children can remember an 
occurrence of a repeated event is determined by a wide range of factors including the age of the 
child, the time between the event and the interview, and the nature of the event details being 
recalled. After multiple occurrences of an event, details that are fixed (experienced exactly the 
same way during each occurrence) are strengthened in memory and are therefore well remembered 
over time compared to details of an event that was experienced only one time (Holliday et al., 
1999; Hudson, 1990; Pezdek & Roe, 1995; Powell & Thomson, 1996). The better items are 
remembered, the less likely they are to be contaminated or altered (Pezdek & Roe, 1995). 
However, with regards to children’s recall of details that varied across the occurrences (e.g., 
remembering what clothing was worn by a person the last time the event was experienced when 
the items of clothing differed each time), repeated experience has detrimental effects on children’s 
ability to remember a particular occurrence. Specifically, the number of correct details reported 
about a particular occurrence is lower than when recalling a single event and intrusions of details 
from other occurrences (hereby referred to as internal intrusion errors) are common (Hudson, 
1990; Powell & Thomson, 1996; Farrar & Goodman, 1992). While external intrusion errors (the 
reporting of details that had not been included in any occurrence) are less likely to be reported by 
children who experienced a repeated versus a one-time event, the number of internal intrusion 
errors outweighs the number of external intrusion errors reported by children who have 
experienced a single occurrence.  The high number of internal intrusions arise because recalling 
an occurrence of a repeated event involves memory of content (i.e., remembering which details 
were experienced in the event per se) as well as the capacity to remember the source or temporal 
location of details (i.e., remembering precisely which details were included in the target 
occurrence while keeping this occurrence distinct from other occurrences in time). While memory 
for both the content and temporal source of details declines over time, the decline is more rapid for 
temporal information (Powell & Thomson, 1997a).  
The problems associated with the recall of variable details of an occurrence of a repeated 
event are accentuated under certain conditions. The more frequently events are experienced, the 
longer the time delay between the event and the interview, and the greater the similarity between 
the events, the more difficult it is to keep track of which details were included in a particular 
occurrence (Lindsay et al., 1991; Powell & Thomson, 1996; 1997a, 1997b, Roberts & Blades, 
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1999). Young children (i.e., 4-5 year olds) have greater difficulties in discriminating between 
occurrences of a repeated event than older children (Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Powell & 
Thomson, 1996). Further, the accuracy of children’s recall of an occurrence of a repeated event is 
shaped by the manner in which memory is tested. When children are asked to freely report what 
happened in an occurrence of a repeated event in their own words, they provide few specific 
features that discriminate one occurrence from others in a series. In contrast, when questions are 
asked which focus the child on aspects of the event that were likely to have varied, the child 
provides a greater number of correct specific details about the occurrence compared to that which 
is provided during free recall (Powell & Thomson, 1996). This is because details contained in 
questions cue the child to information that is available in memory but could not be spontaneously 
recalled (Dent & Stephenson, 1979). However, the number of errors increases with the use of more 
highly specific questions because when the interviewer requests specific information that is not 
available or accessible, the child may guess or make up a response merely to comply with the 
interviewer’s request or may be led to believe that the interviewer’s assumptions are correct. These 
demand characteristics are particularly strong in relation to yes/no or forced-choice questions 
because a child can choose an option offered by the interviewer even when they do not understand 
the question. These questions do not encourage elaborate memory retrieval and they imply that one 
of the options presented by the interviewer is correct. Further, if the question incorporates false 
information about the occurrence, this false information may be later incorporated into the child’s 
account of the event (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). 
While all children are susceptible to suggestive or leading questions (Ceci & Bruck, 1993), 
the issue of suggestibility is particularly pertinent in relation to repeated events. This is because 
repeated experience has been shown to increase children’s willingness to accept false information 
suggested by an interviewer. For instance, in research by Connolly and Lindsay (2001) 4-, 6- and 
8-year-old children participated in either one or four sessions of a play event at their school or 
daycare. The event involved a paper folding game and a magic trick, and for the repeated event, 
some of the details that made up these activities (e.g., the object that was made or the magic words 
that were said) changed in every occurrence. Three days after the target occurrence (the final or 
single occurrence), details that had not occurred in any of the sessions were suggested to have 
occurred during the target occurrence (e.g., the interviewer told the children that they used a 
yellow wand to do magic when the wand was silver). The next day, when memory of the target 
occurrence was tested using yes/no questions (e.g., “Was the wand silver?”), children in the 
repeated condition inaccurately claimed that the suggested detail occurred more than did children 
in the single event condition. The authors interpreted their results in terms of script theory. After 
repeated experience, an abstract cognitive representation of what usually happens in the event is 
generated (see Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Hudson et al., 1992, for reviews). Variable details are 
supposedly represented as a dynamic list-like set of options, none of which are strongly associated 
with a particular occurrence of the event. If the interviewer suggests a novel instantiation of a 
variable detail that is consistent in theme with the other listed options, this may be incorporated as 
a false memory of a schema-consistent option.  
Interestingly, however, a detrimental effect of repeated experience on children’s 
suggestibility has not been apparent across all research. In two experiments conducted by Powell 
et al. (1999) the effect of suggestive questions was examined on children’s recall of the final 
occurrence of a series of four events across various age groups (i.e., 3-5, 5-6, and 6-8 years). Each 
event involved a series of activities; a warm-up exercise, a story, a puzzle, a resting activity and a 
surprise. Some of the details that made up the activities varied in each occurrence (e.g., the 
children always received a surprise sticker but the theme of the sticker differed each time the event 
was experienced). At various delays (3 days, 1 week and 3 weeks), children received a biasing 
interview where false details were suggested to have occurred in the final/single occurrence. One 
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day after the biasing interview, the children were required to recall which details occurred in the 
final occurrence (e.g., “What was on your sticker?”) The results indicated that repeated experience 
led to a decline in memory of the specific occurrence. However, this effect was not associated with 
increased susceptibility to suggestions about details that had not occurred in the event. Most errors 
in recalling the occurrence of the repeated event were intrusions of details from non-target 
occurrences. In fact, the children who experienced the repeated event were no more likely to recall 
the interviewer’s false suggestions than were the children who participated in the single event. 
The different effect of suggestive information in Connolly and Lindsay's and Powell et al.'s 
research is difficult to interpret because of methodological differences between their experimental 
designs. One major difference was the questioning procedures that were used to elicit the 
children’s memory of the occurrence. In Connolly and Lindsay's work, the effect of repetition was 
examined in response to yes/no questions in which children were given the option of agreeing or 
disagreeing with the presence of true and false details. In the experiments by Powell et al., 
however, the effect of repetition was examined via cued-recall questions in which children had to 
generate or retrieve the instantiation from the target occurrence. These two testing formats may 
have produced different effects because there are marked differences in the social and cognitive 
demands they place on the interviewee and the range of responses they permit (see Dent & 
Stephenson, 1979; Waterman, Blades & Spencer, 2000). In Connolly and Lindsay’s study, the 
children may have been more likely to report the suggested instantiations because they merely had 
to acquiesce to the presence of the suggested detail. When the children did not immediately 
remember the specific detail from the target occurrence, which was more likely to be the case for 
the children in the repeated event condition than those in the single event condition (see Powell & 
Thomson, 1996), they may have agreed with the suggested detail in the yes/no question simply 
because the credible adult interviewer had presented a plausible alternative. With cued-recall 
questions, however, the child is required to reconstruct the target occurrence of the event, and 
retrieve the specific instantiation from that occurrence. In other words, the child is engaged in 
deeper processing than that which is required with yes/no questions (Waterman et al., 2000). 
Deeper processing is more likely to lead to the retrieval of information that can be used to make the 
source judgement (Johnson et al., 1993, Roberts, 2000). Further, with cued-recall questions, a 
range of responses can be made (e.g., internal intrusion errors, don’t know responses, external 
intrusion errors) which reduces the likelihood of reporting the suggested detail.  
 The aim of the current study was to test the prediction that question type mediates 
suggestibility effects after repeated experience with an event. Children aged 5-6 years participated 
in one or four occurrences of a scripted event and were given a biasing interview about the event. 
Given that a major difference between Connolly and Lindsay’s (2001) and Powell et al.’s (1999) 
study was the retention intervals used, the effects of question-type were examined at both a short 
and long intervals; 3-days and 3-weeks. Half of the items in the biasing interview were correctly 
described and half of the items were falsely described. The next day, the children were questioned 
about the single or final occurrence using either cued-recall or yes/no questions to examine 
whether there were differences in the uptake of false suggestions. We predicted that in response to 
yes/no questions, the children with repeated experience would accept the suggestions more often 
than the children who had a single experience of the event. However, this difference would be 
reduced or eliminated when cued-recall questions were asked, irrespective of the time interval, 
given that these questions require deeper processing and permit a range of possible responses.  
 
Method 
Design 
 The design employed was a 2 (Event: single vs. repeat) x 2 (Retention interval: 3 days vs. 3 
weeks) x 2 (Test question format: cued-recall vs. yes/no) with all factors manipulated 
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between-subjects. The children participated in one or four occurrences of a scripted event and were 
given a biasing interview about the target (final or single) occurrence after either a 3-day or a 
3-week delay. The next day, they were given the memory test (using either cued-recall or yes/no 
questions) about the target occurrence. Finally, children participated in a delayed 
source-monitoring test that was held three months after the target occurrence.  See Figure 1 for an 
overview of the design and procedure. 
_______________ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
         _______________ 
Participants 
The participants were aged 5- to 6- years; the same age group as the participants in Powell 
et al.’s (1999; Experiment 2) work which adopted a similar suggestibility paradigm. Children were 
recruited through letters to parents that were distributed in four outer Melbourne metropolitan 
schools. The initial sample included 161 children, however 39 children were excluded because 
they did not attend at least one of the occurrences and/or interviews. The final participant pool 
consisted of 122 children who were assigned to the experimental conditions on a rotational basis 
with the constraint that each Event condition x Retention interval x Question format cell was 
equated for age (in months) and gender. A 2 (Question format: cued-recall, yes/no) t-test revealed 
that age in months did not differ across the conditions (Cued-recall: M = 5 years, 9 months, SD = 
4.22 months, range = 61 to 83 months; Yes/no: M = 5 years, 8 months, SD = 4.18 months, range = 
61 to 80 months), t(120) = 4.10, p <.05.  
Materials 
 Each occurrence of the event consisted of 16 target items that were administered in the 
same temporal order. For the children who participated in the repeated event, all items were 
“variable” in that a new instantiation represented the item in each occurrence across the series. For 
example, the children received a sticker in each occurrence, however the theme of the sticker (e.g., 
dinosaur, flag) differed across the occurrences. In contrast, the children who received the single 
event were obviously only exposed to one instantiation. Table 1 presents the full set of target items 
and possible instantiations that were used to make up the event.  
_______________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
_______________ 
 To control for item effects, the order and choice of instantiations that were selected to make 
up the event, the biasing interview, the memory interview, and the source-monitoring test varied 
across the event conditions. Five sets of items were created (A, B, C, D, and E) in which each item 
was represented by a different instantiation; these are presented in full in Table 1. One of the single 
groups (referred to as Group 1) experienced Set B and Set C was used as the suggested-false 
instantiations, and the other group (Group 2) experienced Set D and Set B was used as the 
suggested-false instantiations. For the repeated event condition, one group (Group 3) experienced 
Sets CDBE in that order, and Set A was used as the suggested-false instantiations; the other group 
(Group 4) experienced, in order, Sets ABDC and Set E was used for the suggested-false 
instantiations. The assignment of true/false instantiations that were suggested in the biasing 
interview were also counterbalanced across the event conditions so that each item in the event was 
equally often referred to as a true and false suggestion in the biasing interview. Refer to Powell et 
al. (1999) for a full rationale of this design. Details about counterbalancing for the memory and 
source-monitoring interviews are described in the ‘procedure’ section. 
Procedure 
The Event 
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 The event was referred to as the “Deakin Activities” and was administered by a research 
assistant in the children’s regular classroom. The four occurrences in the repeated condition were 
evenly spaced over two weeks and were always carried out at the same time of day. On the first (or 
single) occurrence, the confederate said “I've called it the Deakin Activities because some people 
at a place called Deakin University helped me to get all the things ready for what we are going to 
do today”. The 16 items for each occurrence represented various kinds of information (e.g., 
verbalizations, actions, objects, persons), and they centered around several activities: Listening to 
a story, doing a puzzle, having a rest, receiving a surprise, and getting refreshed. While these are 
common childhood activities, the materials were developed solely for this research and hence the 
children would not have had contact with them before. During the final or single occurrence of the 
event (referred to as the “target occurrence”) the children wore a badge which was later used to 
orient them to that occurrence. Teachers were instructed not to talk with the children about the 
activities outside the event or to inform them that they would later be interviewed about the event.  
The Interviews  
 Subsequent to participating in the event, the children individually attended three separate 
interview sessions which were held in an isolated room at the school (not the room where the 
activities took place). In each session they were asked a standard list of questions that were 
conducted by one of two interviewers (neither of whom had administered the activities). The same 
person always conducted the first two sessions for any given child, and a different interviewer 
conducted the third session. First, a biasing interview was conducted which took approximately 10 
minutes to complete and was held either three days or three weeks after the target occurrence. 
Second, a memory interview was conducted which took approximately 15 minutes to complete 
and was held one day after the first interview. Finally, a source monitoring interview was held 
three months after the target occurrence. This latter interview was designed to provide further 
information about the child’s ability to identify the target instantiation in the absence of memorial 
demands or social coercion. In this way, it was possible to see whether the children had been 
genuinely misled or whether they had merely complied with the interviewer during the previous 
interviews. The individual interviews are now discussed in more detail. 
 Session 1: The biasing interview. The aim of the first session was for the interviewer to 
suggest instantiations that may have occurred in the event. After some brief introductory questions 
to determine that the children could remember the Deakin Activities and the badge, the interviewer 
said “I’m going to ask you some questions about the day you wore the badge to the Deakin 
Activities”. A series of 16 questions were asked (in random order) whereby half of the questions 
suggested false instantiations and half of the questions suggested true instantiations in accordance 
with the counterbalancing procedure described earlier (see Materials section). For example, if a 
child received a sticker of a flag in the target occurrence, a corresponding suggested-false question 
might be “What color was the sticker of the dinosaur?” when a dinosaur sticker was not received in 
any occurrence of the event. If a child received a sticker of a flag in the target occurrence, a 
corresponding suggested-true question might be “What color was the sticker of the flag?”. 
Presuppositional questions of this nature have successfully been used to show reliable 
suggestibility effects using a similar event (e.g., Powell et al., 1999). Note that the children were 
reminded approximately every third question that they were supposed to be recalling the day they 
wore the badge to the Deakin Activities.  
 Session 2: The memory test. The aim of the second session was to examine the children’s 
recall or recognition of the instantiations that were included in the target occurrence and thereby 
compare the effect of the biasing interview across the event conditions. The interviewer initially 
introduced herself to the child again and explained that she had lost all of the child’s initial answers 
and so needed to ask some further questions about the day he/she wore the badge to the Deakin 
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Activities. Each child’s recall of the occurrence was then probed using either cued-recall questions 
or yes/no questions (manipulated between subjects).  
For children in the cued-recall condition, a series of 16 questions were asked; one question 
for each of the 16 target items included in the event. For each item, the child was required to recall 
the instantiation that was included in the target occurrence. Examples of these probes include: 
“What did you sit on, the day you wore the badge to the Deakin Activities?”, “What was the 
Koala’s name that day?”, “What was the story about?”  
For children in the yes/no condition, the 16 target items were probed in this session (as with 
the cued-recall questions), however the interviewer suggested instantiations of items and the 
children were merely required to indicate yes or no as to whether the instantiation was included in 
the target occurrence (e.g., “Did you sit on newspaper the day you wore the badge to the Deakin 
Activities?”, “Was the Koala named Pop that day?”, “Was the story about Superpuss?” To prevent 
item effects, it was necessary to probe both the true and false version of each item. To fully 
counterbalance the number and order of the suggestions, then, two sets of 16 questions were 
administered. The first set of questions for Groups 1 and 3 queried instantiations that were the 
same as those instantiations that were suggested in the biasing interview; half of these had been 
true suggestions and half of these had been falsely described in the biasing interview. Questions 
about these suggestions are hereafter referred to as repeated-true yes/no questions and 
repeated-false yes/no questions respectively. The second set of questions for Groups 1 and 3 
queried instantiations that were different to those instantiations that were suggested in the biasing 
interview; half of these had been true suggestions and half of these had been false. Questions about 
these suggestions are hereafter referred to as novel-true yes/no questions and novel-false yes/no 
questions respectively to reflect that the instantiation suggested in the final interview had not been 
suggested in the biasing interview. For Groups 2 and 4, the order of the sets was reversed, therefore 
each item was represented by a question in each of these categories for the children in the repeat 
vs. single conditions. Note that immediately prior to these questions, all children were given two 
easy practice questions (using entirely new items) to determine whether they could say ‘no’ to the 
interviewer. 
Session 3: The source-monitoring test.  The aim of the third test was to give children in 
both event conditions an identical test to see whether they had been genuinely misled. A source 
monitoring test that required children to choose between the target instantiation and a false 
(suggested or new) instantiation was used so that the memory demands of cued-recall questions 
and the social pressure demands of yes/no recognition questions were reduced. In addition, as 
children in the yes/no condition had heard four true and four false suggestions twice (whereas the 
suggestions had only been presented once for children in the cued-recall group) the 
source-monitoring test was administered three months after participation in the target incident so 
that memory had decayed to a similar extent for all children.  
A different interviewer to the one who administered the biasing and recall interviews 
initially introduced herself to the child and explained that she needed to ask some further questions 
about the day he/she wore the badge to the Deakin Activities because the previous interviewer 
thought she might have asked the child about some things that did not happen at that school. The 
children were then asked 16 questions. For the 8 items that were suggested-false in the biasing 
interview the child was offered a choice between the target vs. biasing instantiation (referred to as 
the “biasing” trials). For example, “On the badge day an animal kept the Koala awake. It was a 
wombat or a kangaroo. Think about the badge day and tell me whether a wombat or a kangaroo 
kept the koala awake.” For the remaining 8 items (all of which were suggested-true in the biasing 
interview), the child was offered a choice between the target vs. novel (completely new) 
instantiation (referred to as the “novel” trials). 
Coding  
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Session 1: The biasing interview. To provide an indication of whether the child was misled 
by the false suggestions in the biasing interview, their responses to the biasing interview questions 
were coded according to whether the child openly denied that the instantiation suggested by the 
interviewer had occurred in the target incident. For example, if the interviewer asked “How did the 
lady tie her red cloak?” and the child said “I don’t remember a red cloak” or “The cloak was blue 
that day” or “ She didn’t have a red cloak”, the child was given credit for not going along with the 
suggestion.  
Session 2: The memory test. Responses to the yes/no questions in the memory test session 
were coded as correct or incorrect. Responses to the cued-recall questions in the memory test 
session were assigned to one of five categories as follows: (i) Correct: when the instantiation 
(version of detail, e.g., dinosaur sticker, flag sticker) from the target occurrence was reported; (ii) 
False-suggestion: when the false instantiation that was suggested in the biasing interview was 
reported; (iii) External intrusion error: when an entirely new false instantiation that had not been 
suggested and had not occurred in the series was reported; (iv) Internal intrusion error: when a 
non-target instantiation in the series was reported (these errors can only be made by children in the 
repeated event conditions), (v) Other responses: when confusions of details from within the same 
occurrence, “don’t know” responses, or responses where the child could not decide between 
various alternatives were provided. These ‘other’ responses were not analysed although, for 
completeness, their means are represented in the table. 
Session 3: The source-monitoring test. Responses to the follow-up source monitoring 
questions were coded as correct or incorrect.  
 All the transcripts were first rated by a trained coder. A person who was not otherwise 
involved in the study scored 10% of the transcripts representing a cross-section from all the 
conditions. Inter-rater reliability was calculated by dividing the total number of agreements 
between the two coders by the total possible number of agreements. Reliability was 96% for the 
cued-recall coding and 100% for all other coding.  
Results 
 The results section is split into three parts to show the children’s responses in each 
interview. First, we present preliminary analyses to demonstrate that children in the cued-recall 
and yes/no conditions were equally suggestible at the Biasing Interview. The responses to the 
Memory Interview questions are then presented, first, from children in the cued-recall condition 
and, second, from children in the yes/no group. We then directly compare responses from children 
in these two conditions. Finally, we present the responses of children to the 3-month follow-up 
source monitoring test. 
The Biasing Interview 
To ensure that any effects of the question format variable in the Memory Interview were 
not due to initial differences in suggestibility between the children in the two conditions, the 
responses to the Biasing Interview questions that contained false suggestions were coded for the 
number of times (out of 8) that the children did not refute the suggestion. The data in each 
Experience x Retention Interval cell were then entered into a 2 (Test question format: cued-recall, 
yes/no) t-test, but there were no significant differences between the initial suggestibility scores of 
children in the cued-recall and yes/no groups, ts < 1.65, ps > .10.  
 
 
The Memory Interview 
 Responses to the cued-recall questions. 
 Responses to the 16 cued-recall questions were coded as correct, false-suggestion, external 
intrusion error, internal intrusion error, or “other”, as described above, and the means are displayed 
in Table 2. The total number of correct responses were entered into a 2 (Event: single vs. repeat) x 
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2 (Retention interval: 3 days vs. 3 weeks) x 2 (Suggestion in biasing interview: true vs. false) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the last factor within subjects. There were main effects of 
event, F(1, 58) = 48.68, p < .0001, retention interval, F(1, 58) = 20.83, p < .0001, and suggestion, 
F(1, 58) = 138.99, p < .0001. Children who had experienced the event once (M = 10.41, SD = 2.60) 
gave a greater number of correct answers than those with repeated experience (M = 6.03, SD = 
3.08), and all children gave more correct answers at the 3-day (M = 9.71, SD = 3.10) than the 
3-week delay (M = 6.87, SD = 3.50). In addition, responses to questions about the true suggestions 
(M = 5.48, SD = 1.94) were more accurate than those about false suggestions (M = 2.81, SD = 
2.13). The effects of event and suggestion were qualified by an interaction between them, F(1, 58) 
= 10.22, p < .01, because the difference between correct answers to the true and false suggestions 
was especially strong for children who had experienced the event repeatedly (Single: Ms = 6.19, 
4.22 and SDs = 1.55, 1.60; Repeated: Ms = 4.73, 1.30 and SDs = 2.05, 1.49, for the true and false 
suggestions, respectively).  
______________ 
Insert table 2 here 
______________ 
 The false-suggested responses were entered into a 2 (Event) x 2 (Retention interval) 
ANOVA. The within-subjects variable of suggestion was not included because the false-suggested 
responses reflected answers to false items only. Importantly, the amount of experience with the 
event had no effect on the number of times the children reported the false-suggested version of the 
detail, F < 1. There was also no effect of retention interval although a trend, F(1, 61) = 3.05, p = 
.09, indicated that more false-suggested responses were given at the 3-week (M = 1.68, SD = 1.56) 
than the 3-day delay (M = 1.06, SD = 1.09). 
The total number of external intrusion errors were entered into a 2 (Event) x 2 (Retention 
interval) x 2 (Suggestion) ANOVA with the last factor within subjects. There was a main effect of 
event, F(1, 61) = 7.83, p < .01, because children in the single experience condition reported more 
external intrusions (M = 1.75, SD = 1.64) than did those with repeated experience (M = 0.63, SD = 
1.13). The number of external intrusions reported for the true and false items varied depending on 
whether the children were interviewed three days or three weeks after the biasing interview, F(1, 
58) = 4.34, p < .05. Specifically, at the 3-day delay, children reported less external intrusions for 
the true items (M = 0.58, SD = 0.98) and more external intrusions for the false items (M = 0.63, SD 
= 1.03) than did those who were interviewed at the 3-week delay (Ms = 0.74, 0.48 and SDs = 1.21, 
0.81 for the true and false suggestions, respectively).  
The number of internal intrusion errors were entered into a 2 (Retention interval) x 2 
(Suggestion) ANOVA. The between-subjects event variable was not included because internal 
intrusion errors were only possible for children who had repeated experience. There was an effect 
of suggestion, F(1, 28) = 13.95, p = .001, because children responded to more of the questions 
about the false items with an internal intrusion (M = 3.27, SD = 2.03) than they did in response to 
the true items (M = 1.81, SD = 1.42). There was no effect of event.  
Summary. The responses to the cued-recall questions showed that children who had 
experienced the event once accurately answered more questions than children with repeated 
experience. The children in the single event group, however, also intruded more details external to 
the event into their reports than did those with repeated experience. The timing of the biasing 
interview affected children’s accuracy because their responses were more accurate when misled 
shortly after than a while after the target occurrence. As expected, the amount of experience with 
the event did not mediate the number of times that false suggestions from the biasing interview 
were reported, but overall, responses to questions about falsely suggested items were more 
inaccurate than those about accurately suggested items.  
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Responses to the yes/no questions. 
 Note that all the children initially passed the two practice questions, which indicated that 
they could say ‘no’ to the interviewer. In relation to the test items, there were four types of yes/no 
questions (novel-false, novel-true, repeated-false, and repeated-true). Responses to these questions 
were coded as correct or incorrect (see Table 3 for means). Proportional scores to the correct 
responses were calculated by dividing the total number of correct responses to each type of 
question by the total number of those questions asked1and the means are presented in Table 3. 
______________ 
Insert table 3 here 
______________ 
The correct proportional scores were then entered into a 2 (Event: single, repeat) x 2 
(Retention interval: 3-days, 3-weeks) x 2 (Suggestion in Biasing Interview: true, false) x 2 
(Presentation: novel, repeat) ANOVA, and the suggestion and presentation variables were 
within-subjects. There were main effects of event, F(1, 56) = 9.74, p < .01, and delay, F(1, 56) = 
16.71, p < .001. Children in the single condition (M = .77, SD = 0.11) gave more correct responses 
than those with repeated experience (M = .68, SD = 0.14), and children interviewed after three 
days (M = .78, SD = 0.13) were more accurate than those interviewed after three weeks, (M = .66, 
SD = 0.11). There were also main effects of suggestion, F(1, 56) = 3.95, p = .05, and presentation, 
F(1, 56) = 73.30, p < .001, and an interaction between them, F(1, 56) = 59.92, p < .001, which 
showed that the effects of repeating a suggestion differed depending on whether it was a true or a 
false description. Specifically, children accurately answered more of the repeat-true than 
novel-true questions (Novel-true: M = .85, SD = 0.14; Repeat-true: M = .93, SD = 0.10), but 
answered fewer of the repeat-false than novel-false questions accurately (Novel-false: M = .63, SD 
= 0.30; Repeat-false: M = .50, SD = 0.29).  
Presentation also interacted with event, F(1, 56) = 4.16, p = .046, and delay, F(1, 56) = 
11.12, p < .01, and there was a 3-way interaction between event, delay, and presentation, F(1, 56) = 
4.61, p = .04. As there was also a 3-way Event x Suggestion x Presentation interaction, F(1, 56) = 
7.83, p < .01, planned t-tests were carried out to compare the effects of event for novel-true, 
novel-false, repeat-true, and repeat-false questions at each of the delays (see Table 3 for means). 
These analyses revealed that children in the single event condition were more accurate when 
answering the novel-false and repeat-false questions (i.e., they were more resistant to false 
suggestions) than were the children in the repeat event condition but, interestingly, this difference 
was significant only at the 3-week delay, tnovel-false(27) = 3.87, p < .001, trepeat-false(27) = 2.71, p < .01 
(see Table 3). Although children in the single event condition were more accurate than those in the 
repeat event condition when answering the repeat-true questions at the 3-day delay, t(29) = 2.01, p 
= .05, this difference was not present in responses given at the 3-week delay t(27) = 1.07, p > .10. 
Finally, children in the repeat event condition answered more of the novel-true questions 
accurately at the 3-week delay than did children in the single event condition, t(27) = -2.24, p = 
.03. 
Summary. Like responses to the cued-recall questions, more yes/no recognition questions 
were answered accurately by children with a single experience of the event than those with 
repeated experience and responses elicited at the short (3-day) delay were more accurate than 
those at the 3-week delay. Unlike responses to the cued-recall questions, however, children with a 
single experience were more accurate than those with repeated experience when questioned about 
items on which they had heard false suggestions, although this was only evident at the longer 
delay. Finally, repeating the suggestion from the Biasing Interview at the Memory Interview 
increased accuracy for items that had been accurately described at the Biasing Interview, but 
decreased accuracy for falsely-described items.  
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Comparing responses across question format. 
 To directly compare whether question format (cued-recall vs. yes/no recognition) affected 
suggestibility, proportional scores were calculated. For responses to the cued-recall questions, the 
‘false-suggested’ scores (i.e., when children reported the false, suggested version of the detail) 
were re-calculated as a proportion by dividing them by the number of features that were 
inaccurately described in the biasing interview (i.e., eight). Note that these could only have been 
answers to questions about items that had been falsely described in the Biasing Interview. There 
were three types of yes/no questions that probed an item that had been inaccurately described at 
some point: Novel-false (false suggestion presented at the Memory Interview), novel-true (true 
suggestion at the Memory Interview, false suggestion at the Biasing Interview), and repeat-false 
(false suggestions during both the Biasing and Memory Interviews). The inverse of the 
proportional correct score for each of these types of questions was computed and, thus, a higher 
score indicates a greater degree of suggestibility.  
The incorrect proportional scores for the cued-recall and novel-false yes/no recognition 
questions were compared using a 2 (Event: single, repeat) x 2 (Retention interval: 3-day, 3-week) x 
2 (Question format: cued-recall, yes/no) ANOVA. There were effects of event, F(1, 121) = 7.80, p 
< .01, delay, F(1, 121) = 17.94, p < .001, and question format, F(1, 121) = 27.08, p < .001. Event 
and question format interacted, F(1, 121) = 6.80, p = .01, as did delay and question format, F(1, 
121) = 5.12, p < .03, though both interactions were subsumed by a 3-way interaction between 
event, delay, and question format, F(1, 121) = 4.89, p < .03. To explore the interactions, a 2 (Event) 
x 2 (Retention interval) ANOVA was carried out separately for the responses to the cued-recall 
and novel-false yes/no recognition questions. There were no effects of event nor delay on the 
cued-recall responses, but there were effects of event, F(1, 59) = 10.52, p < .01, and delay, F(1, 
56), and an Event x Delay interaction, F(1, 59) = 3.99, p = .05, on the yes/no responses. Follow-up 
analyses showed that children in the repeat condition who were questioned with yes/no probes had 
higher suggestibility scores than those in the single event condition at the 3-week but not the 3-day 
delay. 
The incorrect proportional scores for the cued-recall and repeat-false yes/no recognition 
questions were then compared using a 2 (Event: single, repeat) x 2 (Retention interval: 3-day, 
3-week) x 2 (Question format: cued-recall, yes/no) ANOVA. Although the effect of event only 
approached significance, F(1, 121) = 3.04, p = .08, there were effects of delay, F(1, 121) = 15.87, p 
< .001, and question format, F(1, 121) = 68.56, p < .001. Delay and question format interacted, 
F(1, 121) = 4.39, p < .04, and there was an Event x Delay x Question format interaction, F(1, 121) 
= 3.81, p = .05. Follow-up 2 (Event) x 2 (Retention interval) ANOVAs revealed that children in the 
repeat event condition had higher suggestibility scores on the repeat-false questions than did 
children with a single experience of the event, though this difference was present only at the 
3-week delay. 
Finally, the incorrect proportional scores for the cued-recall and novel-true yes/no 
recognition questions were compared using a 2 (Event: single, repeat) x 2 (Retention interval: 
3-day, 3-week) x 2 (Question format: cued-recall, yes/no) ANOVA. There were no main effects 
though there was an Event x Delay interaction, F(1, 121) = 4.56, p < .04, because children in the 
single event condition who were questioned at 3-weeks were more suggestible than their 
counterparts who were interviewed after three days. There was no effect of delay on responses 
from children who had had repeated experience.  
Summary. Although children with repeated experience of the event were more suggestible 
than others who had a single experience of the event, the detrimental effect of experience was only 
observed in connection with the other variables. Specifically, the effect of experience was only 
evident when children were questioned with yes/no rather than cued-recall questions, when they 
were interviewed 3-weeks rather than 3-days after participating in the event, and when the false 
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suggestion was explicitly mentioned at the Memory Interview (i.e., the novel-false and 
repeat-false questions). 
The source-monitoring interview 
Children were required to choose between the target and biasing instantiation (BIASING 
trials) or between the target and a new, false instantiation (novel trials). The number of correct 
responses (i.e., choosing the target instantiation) from these 16 forced-choice questions was 
entered into a 2 (Event: single vs. repeat) x 2 (Retention interval: 3 days vs. 3 weeks) x 2 (Question 
format: yes/no, cued-recall) x 2 (Trial: novel, biasing) ANOVA with the last factor manipulated 
within subjects. There were main effects for event, F(1, 111) = 20.09, p < .0001, and trial, F(1, 
111) = 67.53, p< .0001. Children in the single-event conditions selected the target instantiation 
more often (M = 13.67 out of 16, SD = 1.58) than those in the repeated-event conditions (M = 
12.16, SD = 2.12), and children answered more of the questions correctly on the novel trials (M = 
7.10 out of 8, SD = 1.14) than the biasing trials (M = 5.83, SD = 1.47). Further, these effects were 
modified by an interaction between them; the difference between the novel and biasing trials was 
greater for the children in the repeat condition than those in the single condition, showing high 
errors on biasing trials by children who had repeated experience with the event.  
Discussion 
 In this study, we examined whether the effect of repeated experience on children’s 
suggestibility differs depending on whether memory is probed with cued-recall or yes/no 
questions. In particular, we predicted that the effect of repetition on suggestibility would be greater 
in response to yes/no questions compared to cued-recall questions and this prediction was 
supported. With regards to the yes/no questions, children in the repeated-event groups were more 
likely to acquiesce to false suggestions than children in the single-event groups. The detrimental 
effect of repeated experience on suggestibility was reduced, however, when the children were 
asked cued-recall questions. In fact, the amount of experience was found to have no effect on the 
number of times the children reported the false-suggested version of the detail in response to 
cued-recall questions. While these responses are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Powell et 
al., 1999; Connolly & Lindsay, 2001), this is the first study to directly compare the effect of both 
question-types within a single experimental design.  
The lack of any effect of event-type on suggestibility for the cued-recall questions does not 
appear to be due to the fact that suggestibility was near floor for these questions. While the actual 
number of false-suggested instantiations that were reported in response to the cued-recall 
questions was low, none of the children were immune to the interviewer’s suggestions. Accuracy 
was generally higher about questions that probed true suggestions than false suggestions 
irrespective of the event group or question-type. Further, in the biasing interview the children who 
were later given the cued-recall questions were no more or less likely to resist the false suggestions 
than the children who were later given the yes/no questions. Taken together, these patterns imply 
that the suggestibility paradigm was working (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). 
The findings involving the cued-recall questions should also not be taken to mean that the 
children who experienced the repeated event were more accurate in remembering the particular 
occurrence of the event. Consistent with previous studies on children’s memory for repeated 
events (Farrar & Goodman, 1990; Hudson, 1990; Powell and Thomson, 1996), repetition led to a 
decline in the children’s ability to remember which instantiations were included in the target 
occurrence. However, the majority of errors that children made after repeated experience were 
intrusions of details from other occurrences of the event. These children rarely reported details that 
did not occur in the event irrespective of whether the false detail was suggested by the interviewer. 
In fact, external intrusion errors (entirely new false details that had not been suggested and had not 
occurred in the series) were less likely to be reported by the children who experienced the repeated 
event compared to the single event. It seems then, that under cued-recall conditions, the ability of 
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children who experienced a repeated event to monitor the relative position of experienced details 
from within the series of occurrences is a much more critical or powerful problem than 
distinguishing completely false information from information that occurred in the event.  
 So why was the detrimental effect of repeated experience on children’s suggestibility 
eliminated when the children were asked to generate a response in their own words? The previous 
literature offers little in the way of reconciling these results because there has been little empirical 
investigation to date of the differential outcomes associated with yes/no versus cued-recall 
questions. Further, current theories of memory merely state that interpolation of false information 
is more likely to occur when memory is weaker. The children’s ability to remember the particular 
occurrence from the series was poorer irrespective of which type of question was asked. We 
propose that the different patterns of results relate to the different nature of the tasks. In a 
cued-recall task, the children must search their memory to generate the correct response and they 
are free to draw on a range of possible responses (internal intrusions and ‘don’t know’ responses 
included). In contrast, with the recognition questions, the interviewer generates the possible 
answer and the range of responses is limited (i.e., the child can either respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’). There 
are two possible reasons why the nature of these questions may have produced the different results.   
First, the results involving the cued-recall questions may be explained by probability 
factors. Compared to the single event groups, the children who experienced the repeated event had 
a relatively large pool of knowledge about the event to draw from (i.e., for each item probed they 
had experienced three non-target instantiations as well as one target instantiation). The larger the 
array of familiar items available in memory, the lower the probability that the child will choose the 
misinformation over an experienced detail. In cases where there is a relatively large pool of 
familiar items available in memory, children who experience a repeated event may be no more 
likely to select the suggested detail compared to children who experience a single event, even 
though the suggestion may seem more plausible to them (Powell et al., 1999). 
Second, the results could be accounted for by differences in the relative strength or 
accessibility of real versus suggested instantiations for the two event groups. Although repetition 
can lead to strong memory traces for fixed, invariant details (see Powell et al., 1999), it may also 
contribute to the strengthening of traces for variable items. Each time new instantiations of items 
were experienced in the repeated event, previous instantiations may have been retrieved, thereby 
creating stronger memory traces for individual instantiations that occurred in the event (Marche, 
1999; Keeney et al., 1967; Roberts et al., 1999). Indeed, we observed that the children who 
participated in the repeated occurrences openly discussed and contrasted the previous 
instantiations each time a new instantiation was presented in the event. Further, as children 
experienced the event repeatedly, they may have begun to form a general representation of the 
event that helped them to anticipate a routine (Farrar & Goodman, 1990). The cognitive operations 
associated with children's expectation of a familiar routine may have improved their memory of 
the real (experienced) instantiations by focusing their attention on the aspects of the event that 
varied (Foley et al., 1991). While the act of recalling an occurrence after repeated experience is a 
more challenging task than remembering a single event, the benefit of having many well-encoded 
instantiations may have compensated in part for the detrimental effect of interviewer suggestions 
on the children’s memory. In contrast, judgements about recognition questions would have been 
based merely on plausibility or a “quick-match” strategy, especially when retrieval of the target 
occurrence was difficult (e.g., when the event was experienced repeatedly and/or when memory 
was tested after a longer delay). Because retrieval of the occurrence would have been more 
difficult for the children who experienced the repeated event, they would have needed to rely more 
often on the interviewer’s suggestions provided in the yes/no questions than the children in the 
single-event condition, rather than spend the time and effort retrieving information. This would 
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explain the strong bias to say ‘yes’ that seemed to be operating in the repeat-event groups, 
especially at the 3-week delay. 
 It is important to note, however, that the children who experienced the repeated event and 
participated in the yes/no interview were not simply complying with the interviewer more than 
those with a single experience. We tested this in the follow-up test by forcing the children to 
choose between the suggested and target instantiations. It was found that children with a single 
experience correctly chose the target item more than those with repeated experience regardless of 
the recognition question format (yes/no or forced choice questions). Furthermore, choosing 
between the target instantiation and the suggested instantiation (which requires source monitoring) 
was found to be more difficult than choosing between target and novel instantiations (which 
requires recognition only), particularly for the children who had repeatedly experienced the event. 
These data suggest that children in the repeated-event condition were more confused by the 
interviewer’s false suggestions than the children in the single-event condition. This could be 
because repeated experience increases the likelihood that false suggestions will be incorporated 
into the children’s memory of the event, or alternatively, perhaps it merely reduces the 
accessibility of experienced instantiations (Zaragoza et al., 1992).  
 When considering the interactions between event group and retention interval for the cued 
recall questions that were inaccurately described in the biasing interview versus the false yes/no 
recognition questions, the data offers partial support for the above interpretations. We know that 
children’s ability to recall an occurrence of a repeated event declines at a much faster rate than 
children’s recall of a single occurrence (due to interference effects; ssee Powell & Thomson, 
1997a). As the children’s memory of the particular occurrence becomes less clear, the plausibility 
of the interviewer’s false-suggestions would increase and so too would the child’s willingness to 
conform or comply with the interviewer’s suggestion. This is consistent with the data for the 
yes/no questions but not the cued-recall questions. For the yes/no questions, the errors increased 
over time at a faster rate for the repeated-event groups. However, after probing with the cued-recall 
questions, the increase in suggestibility over time was relatively small and equal for both event 
groups. One might expect that, for the children who experienced the repeated event in particular, 
the probability of reporting the false-suggested information would have increased over time as 
their pool of knowledge about the event declined. However, the delays used in this study could be 
considered relatively short. As Powell and Thomson (1997a) showed, the children would have still 
remembered most of the possible instantiations for each item at the three-week delay. In fact, in 
one study which used a similar event as that used in this study, a large proportion of instantiations 
were still remembered by children at a twelve week delay (Powell & Thomson, 1997b). Further 
research could explore the generalisability of these findings by including much longer retention 
intervals than that used in this study. 
  The results of this study are important because they show that inconsistencies in the effect 
of repeated experience in previous studies may be partly accounted for by different questioning 
procedures (i.e., whether memory was elicited with cued-recall or recognition questions). For 
instance, Powell et al (1999) tested children’s memory with cued-recall questions and reported that 
repeated experience had no detrimental effect on children’s suggestibility whereas Connolly and 
Lindsay (2001) used yes/no questions and found that suggestibility was greater after a repeated 
event compared to a single event. Until researchers have fully explored the boundaries in which 
children are suggestible after repeated experience with an event, they need to be cautious not to 
assume that the findings arising from any particular experimental paradigm are generalisable. 
Further, researchers need to be cautious not to assume that theories of memory and suggestibility 
that have arisen from work involving children’s memory for single events generalise to 
repeated-event groups. The distinct pattern of errors found in this research suggests that theories of 
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suggestibility may need to take new directions for predicting the suggestibility of children who 
have experienced a repeated event. 
 In light of these findings, it is important that lawyers and investigative interviewers 
consider the difficulties children have in recalling an occurrence of a repeated event, and consider 
how they can minimise the likelihood that false information will be incorporated into the child’s 
account. The results of this study are considered to be generalisable at least in part to forensic 
settings because many children who give evidence are required to remember specific details about 
an occurrence of a repeated event with some degree of precision. Two major implications can be 
drawn from these findings. First, yes/no or forced-choice questions should be avoided in 
investigative interviews especially when it is suspected that the child has experienced a multiple 
offence. The adoption of non-leading cued-recall questions, and more open-ended questions, is 
likely to reduce the child’s susceptibility to interviewer suggestion, especially when the interview 
is taking place after a delay in time. Second, while after long delays a child may be able to recall 
many details about the offence per se in response to cued-recall questions, the child's ability to 
identify features specific to the occurrence(s) in question is likely to be diminished. In other words, 
the timing of the interview is likely to be an important factor in determining the number and 
accuracy of specific details recalled by the child about one of the occurrences. Ideally evidence 
about an occurrence of a repeated event should be obtained as soon as practicable after a disclosure 
is made. With modern technology and the capacity to videotape children's evidence-in-chief (see 
Davies et al., 1995), there are fewer impediments to obtaining evidence shortly after a disclosure is 
made.  
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 Table 1 
Entire Set of Target Items and Instantiations 
 
No. ITEM INSTANTIATION 
  A B C D E 
1.
  
Children sit on X cardboard garbage bag rubber mat white sheet newspaper 
2.
  
Cloak of leader red yellow white blue green 
3.
  
Koala’s name Boo Kip Pop Stan Jo 
4.
  
Noisy animal kangaroo goanna kookaburra dingo wombat 
5.
  
Warm-up activity run wiggle 
fingers 
touch toes jump dance 
 
6.
  
 
Source of story 
 
cupboard 
 
leader wrote 
 
posted 
 
library 
 
present under 
tree 
 
7.
  
 
Content of story 
 
police 
 
sea creature 
 
Easter 
 
Supercat 
 
elephant 
8.
  
Child who holds up 
pictures 
Child A Child B Child C Child D Child E 
 
9.
  
 
Utensil to note who 
child is 
 
pencil 
 
crayon 
 
chalk 
 
texter 
 
ballpoint pen 
 
10.
  
 
Puzzle 
 
car with flat 
tyre 
 
eating cakes 
 
balancing 
balls 
 
juggling 
 
walking on 
tightrope 
 
11.
  
 
Music/scene for 
resting 
 
beach 
 
kites 
 
birds 
 
rain 
 
park 
 
12.
  
 
Part of body is 
relaxed 
 
legs 
 
nose 
 
stomach 
 
arms 
 
neck 
 
13.
  
 
Method of getting 
refreshed 
 
baby wipe 
 
fan  
(paper plate) 
 
hand-cream 
 
face spray 
 
cool drink 
 
14.
  
 
Theme of sticker 
 
rocket 
 
dinosaur 
 
apple 
 
flag 
 
ball 
15.
  
Container with 
stickers 
pencil case purse envelope jar basket 
 
16.
  
 
Next stop 
 
to movie 
 
walking a 
dog 
 
visiting 
friend in 
hospital 
 
birthday 
party 
 
going on 
holiday 
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Table 2 
Accuracy of Responses to the Cued-Recall Questions as a function of how they were described in 
the Biasing Interview.  
 
Condition Type of instantiation reported by the child 
 Correct False 
suggestion 
External 
intrusion 
Internal 
intrusion 
Other 
 True items 
Single event      
  3 day del (N=16) 6.69 (1.35) -- 0.50 (0.82) -- 0.75 (0.93) 
  3 wk del (N=16) 5.69 (1.62) -- 1.19 (1.52) -- 1.13 (0.89) 
Repeated event      
   3 day del 
(N=15) 
5.87 (1.41) -- 0.33 (0.49) 1.33 (1.18) 0.47 (0.83) 
   3 wk del (N=15) 3.60 (1.99) -- 0.27 (0.46) 2.40 (1.45) 1.73 (2.05) 
 False items 
Single event      
   3 day del 
(N=16) 
4.81 (1.60) 0.88 (0.96) 1.06 (1.24) -- 1.31 (1.08) 
   3 wk del (N=16) 3.63 (1.41) 1.81 (1.56) 0.75 (1.00) -- 1.81 (1.17) 
Repeated event      
   3 day del 
(N=15) 
1.93 (1.79) 1.27 (1.22) 0.47 (1.13) 2.93 (1.94) 1.40 (1.50) 
   3 wk del (N=15) 0.67 (0.72) 1.53 (1.60) 0.20 (0.41) 3.60 (2.13) 2.00 (2.73) 
 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Internal intrusions were not possible for 
children with a single experience of the event. 
 
Table 3 
Proportion of Accurate Responses to the Yes/No Recognition Questions as a function of how they 
were described in the Biasing and Memory Interviews. 
 
Condition Type of Question 
 Novel-False Novel-True Repeated-False Repeated- True 
Single event     
  3 day del (N=16) .79 (.16) .87 (.15) .63 (.25) .95 (.06) 
  3 wk del (N=14) .67 (.16) .79 (.12) .50 (.22) .96 (.06) 
Repeated event     
   3 day del 
(N=15) 
.71 (.33) .82 (.15) .61 (.30) .89 (.10) 
   3 wk del (N=15) .34 (.28) .90 (.14) .26 (.25) .91 (.15) 
 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Question formats: “Novel-false” = probed an 
instantiation that was not in the event and the target instantiation had been suggested in the biasing 
interview; “novel-true” = probed an instantiation from the target occurrence and a false 
instantiation had been offered in the biasing interview; “repeated-false” = probed an instantiation 
that was not in the event and the same instantiation had been suggested in the biasing interview; 
“repeated-true” = probed an instantiation from the target occurrence and the same instantiation 
was suggested in the biasing interview.  
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Endnotes 
1. Proportional scores were calculated because for the yes/no questions for Groups 2 and 4, the 
repeated-false instantiation associated with Item 8 was accidentally reported by the interviewer 
instead of the novel-false suggestion. 
